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     ARGUMENT
I. THE MDI “OBLIGATIONS” WHICH MS. MITCHELL ATTEMPTS TO CREATE
ARE FICTIONAL AND IRRELEVANT.
Ms. Mitchell argues that at the time of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce Mr. Mitchell owed MDI a debt or obligation for
which he remained responsible under paragraph 19 of the Decree. 
She acknowledges that the May 7, 1998 assignment letter1 “did
relieve Mr. Mitchell of the debt of the judgments [sic].” (Resp.
Br. 7).  However, she contends that the assignment letter also
created a obligations to MDI.  In support of her contention, Ms.
Mitchell quotes selectively from the May 7, 1998 assignment
letter and asserts that
“Here the agreement evidenced by the Assignment Letter
creates explicit obligations in Mr. Mitchell to continue
collection of the Collins’ [sic] Judgment through his
attorney, Mr. Frank Mesmer, as well as an implicit
obligation to determine ‘his interest in the judgment’ vis-
a`-vis his then wife.”
(Resp. Br. 7).
Ms. Mitchell’s contention misses the point.  It is also
unfounded.  Even if Mr. Mitchell owed MDI obligations to continue
collection of the Collins Judgment and to determine the extent of
his joint interest in the judgment, those obligations would not
be relevant.  The only relevant debt or obligation which Mr.
Mitchell ever owed to MDI was the obligation to pay money
reflected in FDIC Judgment.  If the FDIC Judgment remained
2Before the district court, Ms. Mitchell argued that the
FDIC Judgment was not satisfied prior to the entry of the Decree
of Divorce because the Mr. Mitchell’s assignment of his interest
in the Collins Judgment was “not an unconditional assignment.” 
R. 141 (Ms. Mitchell’s emphasis).  Ms. Mitchell has abandoned
that argument on appeal and now concedes that the assignment “did
relieve Mr. Mitchell of the debt of the judgments...”  (Resp. Br.
7).
3Ms. Mitchell refers to Mr. Mesmer as Mr. Mitchell’s
attorney.  However, it should be noted that he was also Ms.
Mitchell’s attorney.  (R. 174-175).
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unsatisfied at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce,
then it was a debt or obligation for which Mr. Mitchell was
responsible under paragraph 19 of the Decree of Divorce.  If, on
the other, the FDIC Judgment was extinguished more than four
years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, as Mr.
Mitchell contends and Ms. Mitchell now concedes2, then it was
clearly not Mr. Mitchell’s individual “debt or obligation” within
the plain unambiguous meaning of paragraph 19 of the Decree.
Furthermore, the May 7, 1998 assignment letter clearly did
not “create[] explicit obligations in Mr. Mitchell to continue
collection of the Collins’ [sic] Judgment through his attorney,
Mr. Frank Mesmer...”3  (Resp. Br. 7)  In point of fact, the
assignment letter says nothing whatsoever about Mr. Mitchell
continuing to collect the Collins Judgment.  While the letter
does recognize MDI’s desire that “Mr. Mesmer will continue to
collect the judgment in accordance with the current arrangement
...,” it also specifically provides that “... we will consider
4Brief of Appellant, Addendum IV.
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this letter to constitute the agreement and assignments.  You may
then contact Frank Mesmer directly and send me the notes and a
copy of the Satisfaction of Judgment against [Mr. Mitchell].” 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum IV)(emphasis added).  The clear
intent is that MDI would deal directly with Mr. Mesmer regarding
collection of the judgment.
Nor does the assignment letter implicitly require Mr.
Mitchell to “to determine ‘his interest in the judgment’ vis-a`-
vis his then wife.”  Mr. Mitchell assigned to MDI “all of his
interest in the judgment which he and his wife have against Steve
Collins”4 period.  The presumption is that where two or more
persons hold property as tenants in common their shares are
equal.  In the Matter of the Estate of Gorrell, 765 P.2d 878, 789
(Utah 1988).  Ms. Mitchell has never made any claim that she was
entitled to more than an equal share of the proceeds from the
Collins Judgment.  However, even if she had done so, it would
have been MDI’s responsibility to take whatever action it deemed
necessary to determine the extent of the interest which it
acquired from Mr. Mitchell.  There is nothing in the assignment
letter which would have required Mr. Mitchell to do so.
7  II. THE MDI ASSIGNMENT REMOVED MR. MITCHELL’S INTEREST IN THE
COLLINS JUDGMENT FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE MORE THAN FOUR
YEARS PRIOR TO THE PARTIES’ SEPARATION AND DIVORCE.
Ms. Mitchell does not deny that she was aware of Mr.
Mitchell’s assignment of his interest in the Collins Judgment. 
She argues, however, that the assignment did not remove Mr.
Mitchell’s interest from the marital estate because the
assignment “did not - and could not - determine Ms. Mitchell’s
part of the marital estate.”  (Resp. Br. 4).  Ms. Mitchell’s
argument is without merit.  
As set forth above, the Supreme Court of Utah recognizes the
presumption that where two or more persons hold property as
tenants in common their shares are equal.  In the Matter of the
Estate of Gorrell, 765 P.2d 878, 789 (Utah 1988).  It is well
recognized that tenants in common may freely sell or otherwise
transfer their undivided interests as they choose.  E.g., Taylor
v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961, 964 (Colo. 2004).
“A tenancy in common is a form of ownership in which each
co-tenant owns a separate fractional share of undivided
property ... Each co-tenant [] possesses the right to:
unilaterally alienate his or her interest, through sale,
gift, or encumbrance ...”  
Id. (citing United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279-80, 122
S.Ct. 1414, 152 L.Ed.2d 437 (2002))(emphasis added).  
When MDI made contact with Mr. Mitchell in early 1998
attempting to collect the FDIC Judgment, Mr. Mitchell was
entitled to and did assign his undivided interest in the FDIC
5Ms. Mitchell and the Mitchell’s children were, of course,
direct beneficiaries of the assignment because it served to
protect the family income and assets from being seized to satisfy
the FDIC Judgment.
8
Judgment to MDI in order to put a stop to MDI’s collection
efforts.5  Accordingly, when the parties separated and divorced
more than four years later, it was only Ms. Mitchell’s interest
in the Collins Judgment which remained as a marital asset. 
Underlying Ms. Mitchell’s position in this case is the
unstated contention that she is somehow being treated unfairly by
Mr. Mitchell, that Mr. Mitchell is attempting to require her pay
one-half of a debt which she in fairness should not be required
to pay, and that Mr. Mitchell is attempting to unfairly make
claim to one-half of an asset which in fairness should be hers
alone.  The short response to this contention is that both the
Collins Judgment and the FDIC Judgment arose out of Mr.
Mitchell’s failed business relationship with Mr. Collins. 
Accordingly, even if Mr. Mitchell’s interest in the Collins
Judgment had still been part of the marital estate at the time of
the Decree of Divorce, it would not have been fair or reasonable
that Ms. Mitchell be entitled to one-half of the proceeds from
the Collins lawsuit (i.e., the up-side of Mr. Mitchell’s failed
business relationship with Mr. Collins), but that Mr. Mitchell be
solely responsible for paying the FDIC judgment (i.e., the down-
side of that very same failed business relationship with Mr.
6It is worth noting that the only reason why Ms. Mitchell
had any interest in the Collins Judgment at all is because she
was Mr. Mitchell’s spouse.  (R. 121-138).
9
Collins).6 
III. MS. MITCHELL’S BELATED DENIAL OF HER AWARENESS OF THE
RECEIPT AND AMOUNT OF THE FIRST COLLINS LAWSUIT
DISTRIBUTION IS NEITHER CREDIBLE NOR RELEVANT.
In part F of her Argument, Ms. Mitchell asserts that 
“Mr. Mitchell inappropriately raises and argues facts, which
were disputed and not established in the district court and
which were not raised and are not at issue in this appeal. 
Indeed, the ‘facts’ raised by Mr. Mitchell in support of his
inappropriate argument concerning Ms. Mitchell’s awareness
and involvement in Mr. Mitchell’s interpretation of the
Decree were disputed and refuted by Ms. Mitchell’s proferred
testimony in the hearing held April 22, 2009.”  
(Resp. Br. 10-11).  Unfortunately, Ms. Mitchell fails to identify
the “facts” to which she refers and she fails to explain how they
were inappropriately raised and argued.  Further, at no time did
Ms. Mitchell make any proffer of testimony in the district court
and, of course, the district court did not accept any proffer of
testimony.  
Mr. Mitchell speculates, however, that Ms. Mitchell may be
referring to paragraph 10 of Mr. Mitchell’s “Statement of Facts,”
which provides that:
10. In August 2002, approximately one month after the entry
of the Decree of Divorce, Ms. Mitchell received a check in
the mail from Mr. Mesmer in the amount of $180,106.58 made
payable jointly to the parties.  (R. 78)  This check was
proceeds from the Collins lawsuit.  Ms. Mitchell contacted
Mr. Mitchell and both parties negotiated the check and
returned it to Mr. Mesmer.  Mr. Mesmer then sent Ms.
Mitchell a second check in the amount of $66,274.79, which
7To be fair, Ms. Mitchell first changed her story during the
April 22, 2009 hearing, not on appeal.  However, she did so only
after Mr. Mitchell presented to the district court a copy of the
check which Ms. Mitchell wrote on her personal checking account
in the amount of $33,137.40 (R. 80) and delivered to Mr. Mitchell
as his one-half share of her share of the Collins lawsuit, which
clearly refuted the representation which Ms. Mitchell made to the
district court that it was Mr. Mitchell who “wrote a check to
10
represented Ms. Mitchell’s one-third share of the proceeds
collected by Mr. Mesmer in connection with the Collins
lawsuit.  (R. 79)  What would otherwise have been Mr.
Mitchell’s share of the proceeds was paid by Mr. Mesmer
directly to MDI in accordance with the May 7, 1998
assignment.  (R. 78)  Ms. Mitchell deposited the $66,274.79
check into her Wells Fargo checking account and, in
accordance with paragraph 20 of the Decree of Divorce, gave
Mr. Mitchell a check in the amount of $33,137.40 as his one-
half share of her one-third share of the proceeds from the
Collins lawsuit.  (R. 80)
(Brief of Appellant 5-6).  These facts are clearly established
not only in the cited pages of the record, but by the
representations which Ms. Mitchell made before the district
court.  Ms. Mitchell argues on appeal that she “was unaware of
the receipt or of the total amount of the first August 2002 check
from attorney Mesmer, which was not disclosed or concealed by Mr.
Mitchell.”  (Resp. Br. 15).  However, in her “Response to Order
to Show Cause and Counter Motion to Enforce Decree of Divorce”
Ms. Mitchell represented to the district court that 
“[s]ubsequent to the entry of the parties’ decree of
divorce, in August, 2002, a piece of mail arrived at the
former marital home, then solely occupied by [Ms. Mitchell],
addressed to the parties [from attorney Mesmer] ... The
piece of mail was a check from Mr. Mesmer representing
payment to the parties stemming from the Collins judgment
made out to both parties n [sic] the sum of approximately
$180,000.”7  
[Ms. Mitchell] from his personal checking account for
approximately $30,000.00 which according to [Mr. Mitchell]
represented [Ms. Mitchell’s] share of the [$180,106.58 check]
...” (R. 58).
8The correct amount of the check is $180,106.58.  (R. 78).
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(R. 58)(emphasis added). 
Thus, before the district court Ms. Mitchell not only
acknowledged that she was aware of the amount of the first August
2002 check, but she represented that it was she who retrieved it
from her own mailbox.  Accordingly, Ms. Mitchell’s subsequent
denial that she was aware of the receipt and amount of the first
August 2002 check should be taken with a grain of salt. 
Ms. Mitchell also faults Mr. Mitchell for failing to produce
a copy of the $180,0008 check which she now denies having seen:
“Mr. Mitchell also fails to acknowledge that a copy of the
roughly $180,00 endorsed check, which he claims Ms. Mitchell
had full knowledge of, is conspicuously lacking, despite his
ready supply of endorsed checks which he believes support
his position ...”
(Resp. Br. 16).  What Ms. Mitchell fails to acknowledge is that,
as discussed above, it was she who first brought to district
court’s attention the fact that she received the check from Mr.
Mesmer.  (R. 58).  It was not until the April 22, 2009 hearing
that she changed her story and denied having received or seen the
check.  There was no reason for Mr. Mitchell to produce the check
prior to the change in Ms. Mitchell’s story because it was not at
issue and it was, of course, too late to produce it when she did. 
12
Of course, Ms. Mitchell could also have obtained a copy of the
check from Mr. Mesmer if she believed that it would substantiate
her story.
Furthermore, even if Ms. Mitchell was unaware of the receipt
and amount of the first August 2002 check, that fact has very
little relevance.  MDI was either entitled to one-third of the
check or it was not.  Mr. Mitchell either owed MDI a debt at the
time of the Decree of Divorce or he did not.  Ms. Mitchell’s
awareness or unawareness of the details does not change the
analysis.
IV. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE.
Ms. Mitchell argues that Mr. Mitchell’s assignment of his
interest in the Collins Judgment is barred by the provisions of
the Statute of Frauds found in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1)(a) and
(b).  According to Ms. Mitchell the assignment was an agreement
“which [was] not to be performed within one year or contain[ed] a
promise to answer for the debt of another.”  (Resp. Br. 9).  
Unfortunately, Ms. Mitchell fails to provide any analysis or
explanation to support her argument and the only authority which
she cites in support of her argument is case law involving
entirely different provisions of the Statute of Frauds relating
to transfers of real property.  None of the cases which Ms.
Mitchell cites is on point.
9See Brief of Appellant, Addendum I.
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Mr. Mitchell respectfully submits that the May 7, 1998
assignment letter is clearly not an “agreement that by its terms
is not to be performed within one year from the making of the
agreement” within the meaning of § 25-5-4(1)(a).  It was
effective immediately upon its execution.  Cf. Pasquin v.
Pasquin, 988 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App. 1999)(“... we reiterate the
well-settled proposition that the one-year clause applies only to
contracts that are literally incapable of being performed within
one year”).  Nor is there anything in the assignment letter which
by any stretch of imagination could be construed to be a “promise
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another.”  See
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1)(b).   With all due respect, Ms.
Mitchell’s Statute of Frauds argument is frivolous.
V.   MR. MITCHELL PRESERVED THE ISSUES WHICH HE RAISES ON APPEAL.
Ms. Mitchell asserts that Mr. Mitchell did not preserve for
appeal his objection to subparagraph C(iii) of the district
court’s Findings and Order (Hearing April 22, 2009)9.  She
explains that “[a]lthough, [sic] Mr. Mitchell made factual
allegations which are contradictory to the language to which he
take [sic] exception, he did not object to the form or content of
the Findings and Order (Hearing April 22, 2009), as his Objection
to Commissioner’s Recommendation and argument therein was [sic]
submitted prior to the district court’s order.”  
10See Brief of Appellant, Addendum I.
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Ms. Mitchell’s assertion is frivolous.  She cites no
authority which would support the proposition that Mr. Mitchell
was required to file a motion, presumably under Rules 59 or 60,
URCP, objecting to the form or content of the Findings and Order
to preserve his objection to its findings of fact for appeal. 
This Court has explained that “for an issue to be sufficiently
raised [and preserved for appeal] ... it must at least be raised
to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can
consider it.”  Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT
App 67, ¶ 19, 68 P.3d 1015 (quotations and citations omitted). 
All of the memoranda filed in the district court, and the
arguments made at both hearings before the district court,
addressed the facts and law related to the issues which Mr.
Mitchell raises on appeal.
VI. MR. MITCHELL PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE.
Finally, in support of her contention that Mr. Mitchell
failed to adequately marshal the evidence in support of
subparagraph C(iii) of the district court’s Findings and Order
(Hearing April 22, 2009)10, Ms. Mitchell asserts that “Mr.
Mitchell ignores the proffered testimony of Ms. Mitchell in the
hearing held April 22, 2009...”  Ms. Mitchell’s assertion is
untenable.  At no time during the hearing did Ms. Mitchell make
any proffer of testimony; nor did district court accept any
15
proffer of testimony.  Ms. Mitchell’s counsel presented Ms.
Mitchell’s arguments, but arguments of counsel do not constitute
evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests
that the district court’s Findings and Order (Hearing April 22,
2009) be reversed and that this action be remanded to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this
Court’s decision.
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